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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1\lA.RILYN l{~ ~.fANNING,
)·~
Plain tiff and Appellant,
.. ·- \"H .. I

Case

7
"\\

ESTERN AIRLINES, a eorpora- /
tion, and CONNECTICl_P·r
G EXER.AL LIFE INSURA)ICE
)
(~()~f 1~ . \!\ Y, a c-orporation,
Defendants and Re.~pondents.

No. 9109

j

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PRELIMlNAI-tY

STArrFJ~iJi~XT

The Plaintiff and Appellant~ 'vido1v of one Arthur M.
},fanning~ brought an action in the District Court of Salt
Ijake County against the Respondents to reeover as tl1c
beneficiary of a group insuranee policy·. The Trial Court
summaril~y· dismiRsed A ppe] lant ~s (~ompl aint. The partiL~S
hereinafter \viii be referred to as the}· appeared in the
lo\ver court~ 1\..ppcllant 'viii be referred to as the Plaintiff and Respondents as the Defendants.
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FACTS
This action arises out of the death of Arthur M~ 1\fanning, who was killed while working as an employee of
the Defendant Western Airlines. The said Arthur M.
~Ianning commenced his employment 'vith the Defendant
Western Airlines on May 21, 1957; and on ~lay 25, 1957,
he signed an application for group life insurancet group
accident and sickness insurance~ and group hospital and
surgical benefits with the family to be included and authorized in wrjting deductions from his wages to pay the
preminms thereafter. (Exhibit Dl)
As a part of program of advising J[r. 1\-lanning of
the group insurance plan, Defendant Western Airlines
gave him a pamphlet which had been prepared and publishod as a joint effort on the part of the Defendants.
(Exhibit P2) This booklet, entitled Group Insurance
Plan, contains a schedule of the monthly benefits and
costs to the employee. According to this schedule the total
monthly cost of the insurance plan, including life insut'ance, was $11.42. The monthly deductions by the employer
as shovvn \vere $11L70. (Exhibit D5) Apparently dednc~
tions were being taken on the basis of a new schedule
which the evidence would show had never been given to
decedent and of which he \Vas not aware. (R 42)

The insurance that was issued was, under the Company's Group Insurance Plan, carried with the Defendant Connectient General Life Insuranc-e Company~ (R. 3)
The insurcdt Arthur M . Manning, was killed while V.'orking near an airplane of the Defendant Western Airlines
2
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on August 6, 1957, and 'vhile he was still employed with
the said Defendant (R. 2) At the time that Arthur M.
1\:[anning signed up for the acceptance of the insu ranee
program he came under a Class "'D ~' employee benefit
authorizing the amount of $3,600400 life insurance. (R~ 3)
In addition to the life insura.nc.o eoverage of the pol-

icy, the emp1oyce could have acc.ident,. hospitalization,
family benefits . (l-t4 54) At the time of his employment
Mr. l{anning took out the group life insurance, the group
aceident and sickness insurailce, the group hospital and
surgir-al benefits for both himself and his family. (Exb[hit Dl)
'fhcreaftor~

the said Arthur 1\f. 1\.f anning rceeivcd no-

tinc.ation of hi8 insurance coverage, lUlder certificate No.
8818, '\\"'tth the Plaintiff !\iari1y \·1 anning, his 'Wife, being
named as the beneficiary thercundcr4 (1{4 2 and R. 4)
Subsequently, in the early part of J·une, 1959, 1Ir. I\{an·
ning inquired, in writing, about the poss[hility of dropping the group life insurance part of the program and yet
retain the other port[ons of the insurance. (Exhibit D7)
Before doing so he disr11ssed the matter v.rith his VLrifc;
and they decided thai because of the faet that she 'va~
expecting a child the areident~ sickness and hospita1 provisions should be maintained. {R· 68) From tr1c early part
of June, 1957~ unt.il his death on .A.ugu~t 6, 1957, Jir. J\Trn~ning never received any reply from either t.he Defendant.

Connecticut General Life Insurance Company or the Defendant 'Vestern Airlines4 On the 2nd day of August,
1957., ,\~bon hfr. ~fanning brought honll~ his check covering

3
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the pay period from July 15th to July 31st,. he had still
not heard from the Company regarding his inquiry about
the life insurance part of the insurance and discussed the
matter with his wife, the Plaintiff herein, and dec.ide d to
make further inquiry of the Company. (R. 68) Following
~lr. Marming's death the Defendants refused to pay
Plaintiff under the life insuranc.e pro\ision, claiming 11 r.
Manning had cancelled his policy for life insurance by
reason of Exhibit D74
The group policy provides for the termination of the
insurance as follows:

"F. Insurance Data
(a)

(b) Termination of Insurance. If any em~
ployee cancels l1 is payroll deduction or~
der, his insurance shall cease at the end
of the period for which the last deduction "\ova.s made~~'
(Exhibit D9)
Considerable discovery work was earried on between
the parties in tl1e form of Reque:.-:1ts for Admissions and
Interrogatories. A pre-trial "·Ms held before Judge Faux
on tTune 5, 1959; and in its pre-trial order the (~ourt elim~
inated any claim for aceidcntal death benefit " hieh "·ould
automatically give an additional $3,600~00. The issue
resolved for trial v.ra.s ,vhether or not the insurance policy
remained in effect ( 1) because or failure to pay as required lly the terms of the plan, and ( 2) because of failure
to complete necessary arrangements 'vhich \v<:luld entitle
Plaintiff to recover under said plan. Pursuant to Plaina
7

4
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tiff's (lemand, the rna tt er \vas set down for a jury trial.
(R~ 38)
On J unc 22, 1959, the date set for the trial of this
case, the parties appeared before .Judge Ellett, \vho in~
quired ,\·hethor or not there "'as any issue of fact to be
submitted to the jury.....~t that time, as well as originally
at pre-t1·ialt P1aintin· took the position that there ,,·as no
issue or faet to ue tried becauRe Exhibit. D7, as a matter
of Ia·w-~ did not eo11stitute .a cancellation of the life insurance portion of the group insurance, and further because
Defendant '~l estern . .:\irlines had deducted from decedent's salary more than enough to pay the insurance premiums, including life, as set forth i11 the bulletin (Exhiuit
P2) furnished to decedent by 'Vestern at the time of his
l)eing employed .

In the event the Court did not sustain Plaintiff's posifion in tlLis res pert., Plaintiff insi~ted on having the issue

as to \V h ctlu.~r t.h ere had or had not been a ca n(·ella t ton of
the insurance submitted to t1tc jury. ( lt 36)

J udgc

r~llctt,

during the inquiry, stated t.hat he vrould
like to find out \\"hat issues ,,~ere to he s uhm i tted to the
jury a.nd a diseu~sion took plaee bct.\vepn the Court and
cou11sel about the exhibits to be ~ubmit.t.rd. Exhibits v.rere
then submitted. to the Court and received by the Court as
Exhibit 1 through ] 1 ~ (ll. 77) .i\fter furtl1cr discussion
het\veen Court. a11tl (~ounsel regarding theE.;e exhibit::; the
Court held that ~x hi hit D-"7 sho,ved as a matter of la."\\that Arthur l\l. [\:1 anning had cancelled l1is insurance. An
order was made to that effect in the absence of any motion
l)y the ))efendants.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

I. The Court erred in holding as a· matter of law that
the 1ife insurance policy had been cancelled:
(a) As ~ matter of law the policy had not been
cancelled.
(b) In any event whether or not there had been
a cancellation was an issue to be submitted
to the jury.

---~RGU~1ENT

I. THE COURT ER~ED IX HOLDING AS A
MATTER OF L~-\ W THAT THE LIFE INSUR.ANCE
POLICY HAD Bli~J{~N CANCELLED~
~

~

(a) AS A ~rArrTER OF LAW THE POLICY
HAD NOT BEEN CANCELLED.

Appellant submits that there is one basic issue to be
decided by this appeaL ~:Phis issue rcsol ves itself a round
the construction of Exhibit D-7 . It is admitted by Appol~
!ant and all parties hereto that Exhibit D-9 constitutes
the master insuranC-e poliey.between the Defendant Western Airlines and the Connecticut General Life Insurance
Company. It is also admitted that Mr. Arthur hi. :Manning on Afay 5~ 1957, took out insurance which was covered
by this master insurance policy by means of J1is applica- · ·
tion, Exhibit D-1. The Respondent further recognizes
-that in Exhibit D-9 (the master insurance policy) there is
a specific provision for the termination of the insu~ce
coverage of an in~ividu~l employee. Paragraph F (6)
(On th~ inside of the first cover sheet) provides :
6
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"" If ar1 y employee cancels his pa:.r roll deduction
order., his insurance shall e.easc at the end of the
period for \Vhich the last deductiun "\VHS made. n
There iH no argument in this matter but that .A.rthur
l\L 'I anning continued his employment \Vj U1 the Defendn
ant \V. (~s t.crn Airlines frou1 the date of J\Iay ~:!, 1957 t to
. the date of his death on August 6~ 1957, and that he made
no specific request to ha vc l ~is payroll deduction order
cancelled. In fact, lt is appal·ent he did not intend to do
so 11ntil he 'Yns assured by the 1\i rline Company that jt
~~ould he done without eancclling his otl•cr insurance.
rrhc narrow issue 'vhich the t-rial court apparently decided in th[s matter is whetJ1cr or not Exhibit D-7 consti~
tutes a cancellation of his life insurance 'vith the \Vestern
A irlincs under tho group policy.
Since the Court did not rer.eivc any testimorry and
since there was no motion made by~ the Defendants herein~
Appellant is in doubt as to whether or not the dismissal
v.ras taken pursuant to Rule 41 (b), U. R. C. P. (relating to
an involuntary dismissal) or under Rule 56 (Summary
Judgment Y. In the event a dismissal is t a 1o~n und rr R.ule
41 (b) :findings of fact and conclusion~ or la\\T should have
been submitted. Admittedly no findings are necessary
under Rule 56. For the purpose of this argument .J.l... ppel:.
lant "\\. ill assume that the eourt 's action vras a summary
judgment~ but whether t.aken as a summary judgmeJlt or
involuntary dismissa1 the rules regarding the sufliciency
of the gr~unds therefor are the same.

In Exhibit D-9, 1\'hich is the master group insurance
poliey with V\; estern Airlines and Connecticut General

7
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Life Insurance Company, the provision relating to the
termination of the insurance under Paragraph F (b) is
as follows:
''Termination of Insuranc.e.
" If any employee cancels his employee ded uction order, his insurance .shall cease at the end of
the period for which the last deduction was made.''
{Emphasis added)

The deceased Arthur M. Manning never at any time
cancelled l1is payroll deduction order (Exhibit D-1) . The
law is well settled that the cancellation must be made
strictly in aceordance with the terms of the policy and

notice of cancellation must be unconditional and absolute

in form.
Appleman, Insurance LauJ afld Practice~ Vol. 6, Sec.

4193, provid e.s in part :

right to cancel a policy can be exercised
only in tke mann-er provided in the policy, tmd the
burden of proving a valid cwncellation is on the
party asserting itt'' (Emphasis added)
~ ' 1..' he

In the case of Dyche v. Bostian,

Pf.

al.., (Mo . ) 233 S.W.

2nd 721, it vras claimed that the insured attempted to cancel a policy with the

follo\\~ing

provision=

'~This policy

may be cancelled at any time by
either of tl1c parties upon '\\'rittrn notice to the
other party stating u~ll r.~·n ·n.ot less tham.. te·n days
thereafttr, canceUati.on shall be effertive. The
effective date of s11ch eancellation shall then be tllc
end of the poliry period . " (Emphasis added)
8
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The insured \\Trote a letter on October 24 requesting
eunrellation of the polic)~ . The letter was received by the
agent for the company on October 25., 1946 7 and he :-:;aid
that they shouldn't. cancel the policy until they had talked
it over. The agency again phoned the insured concerning the cancellation of the policy. trhc agent tlJcn sent
the policies to the company for cancellation on K ovember 7 . An injury occurred on November 7, 1946, and the
insured then raised the question of whether or not the
insurance was in effect. The Court l1cld tlHtt the polic-ies
were [n force on November ·1, 1946, stating:

''The lau' is firmly settled that, where a policy
contains a specific provision for ca;ncellat ion by
either party, it is binding upon the parties antd
mu. .';t be strictly complied with in order to tet"minate the policy . In Home Insurance Co . v. Hamilton, 143 ~:[o. 1\_pp. 237, 128 S~\v·~ 273, 274, this
court said : 'A contract (_~overing a ecrla 1n period
of time, but containing a conditional provisio11
that it might be terminated before that time, mil
rem a in eff ecti ve the full term, unless the co ndi ti on
of termination is fully complied 'vith. And this i~
cspcc.ialJy applicab1e to an insnrnnr.c poliey containing a provision allowing a ea r1cc lla tion prior
to the end of the term of insurance . ~ ~"

''It is clear that the above provision .of the
policy for eancellatlon was not followed by the
insured~ It required that the insured give \\·ritten
notice to the eompany and state in the notice the
date on which cancellation was to be effective~ and
the date so specified muK1. not be less than ten
days from the date of the llotiec.. ...:\11 that. the
record sho\vs is tl1 at a letter, atcom-panier.l btJ the
pohcic,.;;;, was 'vrittert hy 1\{rs. Kelly, probably on
October 24, 1946~ to ~-1r...A.ltman ... the most that
9
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can be said from the testimony c.onc:.crning it is that
it requested that Mr . Altman have the policies can~
celled. There 18 absolutely no sl~o,ving that it
speeified any date of cancellation. " (Emphasis
added)

The headnote in the case of blaskatchetvan Governnwnt ln.'Ju·rance Office v~ Padget (1957, ( CCA 5) 24f~ F.
2d 48, clearly states the rule of la.w as foJlovls:
''Generally, an insurance policy is not subjc<'t
to cancellation at the option of the insured or insurer except upon happening of events as specified
in the policy~"

As noted, the cancellation must be strictly in accordance with the terms of the poliey and the terms of the
policy require that he "~ cancels his payroll deduction
order. " The decedent Arthur ~l. :\l anning never cancelled his payroll deduction order, Exhibit' "D-1. '"

The law is equally -clear and well settled that the
notice of req nest for cancellation bo clear and unequivocal:

'' The notice or req nest must be nncondi tional
and absolute, and a cond·ition.al request for cancell-ation is t~.()t sufficie-nt if it is not accepted by the
company. The au.estion whether a CO"Tnn1 n·n.ication
sho·uld or should not be constrned as a. not-l.ce of or
request far cancellation will depend o·n the ·intent
of th-e 1vriter or speaker as ascerta-ined from the
whole instrument or all of i h e circu.mstmnces and
doubts will be construe dagaimt cancellation..''
45 C.•J~ S.~ ''Insurance,'' Sec. 458, P~ 116-117. (Emphasis added}

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·rhe case most nearly analogous to the case at hand
is ilf aq ruder v. li-n. it cd .~~ta-tes, (1929) 32 F. 2d 807. In tb is
case the Court had t'vo issues presented to it: (1) Whether or not the insured had "caneelled'' her life insurance
\vhile Rtill in the service and (2) \ovhcther or not the premiums had l)een paid or 'vaived. 'Vhilc in the service the
insured had authorized deductions from her pay to cover
her \Var R-isk Insurance. TrL~asury R-egulations provided
that the insurance would lapse and terminate upon a Vt;-rif:..
teu request duly 'vjtnessed for cancellation of the insuraucl~ and a r.orrcsponding cessation of the deductions of
premiums from the pay of the individuaL Ilcre t.be Court
refused to find that a war risk insurance policy had been
cancelled \V hen the facts indica ted that the insured had
lined out the authorization for deduction of premiums
from disability compensation and had signed a statement
to tllc cffr~rt that she had been explained her rights to continue her war rlsk insurance after she was separated from
the service, "''but I do not desire to apply for a Government insurance at this time.'' In analyzing the effect of
this instrument the court had this to say: {P. 810)

"1Vhen we came tlJ consider \vhetller or not the
statement in question contains 1anguagc sufficient
to convey the desire of the insured to c.anecl her
policy~ 've are confronted with the "\vell-known
prin ei ple that r eq u cs t for eancellation of an insurance policy must be u·neq_u.-i1)ocal and absol-utf. If
t.he parties in tended that the statemeJlt should be
a cancellation of the policy, they certainly made a
failure in attempting to express that faet, \\~hert
using the form of an 'Applic.ation for lnsuranr..e,'
and stating that the insured did not. desire to apply
for a government insurance at this time ... " rrhe
4

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

..

authority expressed 1n the policy to dedu-ct from
her pay the monthly premiums was· not revoked~
atJJ..d to now hold, after the insured has passed on
and n.ot here to speak~ that the statement was a
cancellation of the policy, would be violative of
the rule recognized by the courts that the cmnceUation of (lin -MM·uran.ce contract must be ab so lu.te and
in clear loog1UJJ.(Ie. "~ (Emphasis added)

In the case of Van Scoy v. NationaJ, Fire ln...'l-urance
Compa-ny of Hartfordt Conm,ecticut, (1921) 191 Iowa 1318,
184 N.\\T. 306, a letter was sent by the insured to the company as follo,vs:
'"'Blcncoe!t Iowa,. June 1, 1919.

''Dear Sirs: I want to get my polieyNo. 467741
c-ancelled that has just reoontly been taken out for
tlltce years. There has been some misunderstand~
ing bot~reen your local agent and myself. Kindly
inform me what is the best you can do. Yours truly
(Signed), W . H . VanScoy . "
The Court stated (at page 307 oi 184 N.\V-.):
"But plaintiff~s letter addressed to the com~
pany on ,.J uue 1, 1919, is obviously neither a request or demand for a cancellation. It does no
n~ore than express a u:ish to hare the policy ca-nr
celled and ask.15 to be informed of the term~ on
\vhieh it could be accomplished. This \Vas a natural
and proper inquiry as preliminary or preparatory
to a cancellation in fnct, for the statute provides
that it shall be done upon 'equitable terms' and
g-iv(~~ to tho rr0mpany the right to exact from plaintiff the customary short rates of premium from
the date of the policy to the date of cancellation.'~
(Emphasis added)
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In the case of Adler v. Burnes, (1934) 288 ~!ass . 309,
192 )J",E. 922, the plaintiff owned some property upon
which she had insurance.. She was about to sell the property and desired to cancel the insurance. Her father who
had been handling her insnranc.e matters went to the
agent for the company, a )fr. Burnes. '' ~ ... He next
talked with Burnes in the enrly part of July in consequence of a. letter; that at that time he told Burnes not to
bother him for the balance of the money as he intended to
sell the property and cancel the policy because tiH~ other
party didn't wa.n t to take them. . . . ' ' Burnes told the
father to try to sell the policies to the new buyers. rrhe
trial court held there had been no cancellation.
"'There is no evidence which would warrant a
finding that there was any definite,. unequivocal demand or request by the plaintiff or by anyone representing her to cancel the policies. All that ap~
pears is that, before the sale of the property to
)Irs. Olson, Bennett was endeavoring to persuade
her to take over the policies, but without success .
Bennett did not make any definite request or demand for an immediate or future ca.ncellation of
the policies. It is said to be a 'well-kno,vn principle
that request for cancellation of an insurance policy
must be unequivoeal and absolute.' ~Iagruder v .
United States (D . C. ), 32 F. (2d) 807, 810; Lyman
Vr State 1\futual Fire Ins~ Co., 14 Allen, 329, 333;
Clark v. Insurance Co4 of North America, 89 J\.Ie.
26, 32, 35 .A.~ 1008, 35 L.R. . A . 276; Davidson v. German Ins . Co., 74 N.J. Law, 487,65 A . 996,13 L.R.A4
(N.S.) 884, 12 Ann~ Cas . 1065. See also cases in
notes 32 C ..J ~ pp. 1259, 1260.. The conversations
between Bennett and Burnes amounted at most to
an expression of intention to cancel the policies at
some time in the future."

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I 11 a s imila1· ease, the case of Phillips v. Hirschi
(1940}, 292 l\1ich. 693,. 201 N.,V. 196. ~irs. Hirschi and the
insuranc-e company lJad an exchange of correspondence
regarding her automobile insurance~ On DecemlJer 2, 1937,
she "\vrot.e to the company and said: '~In reply to yours of
the 1st ~1\Till f.;ay, kindly rctul'n the money and keep your
poI i ey4'' She then \Vent on in her Jetter to explain some
differences that had arisen~ The trial court held that the
poliey had bGen cancelled. Upon appeal the trial court '"-·as
reversed. The Court said:

""\Vhcther. the communication of Mrs. IIirsehi
voided the agreement of protection of the insurance company, depends upon the intent. of t.llc insured; and sueh intent must be gleaned from the
\v hole instrument. The words of the le1 ter ~ 'Ki rl c1ly return the money and koep your policy, I have
"'Taitcd long enough for the same/ taken alone,
'vould indicate that ~Irsa Hirschi intended the insurance to end. But in our opinion the letter, taken
as a \vhole, is susceptible to a different intcrpreta tion.''
_A. ppl~r ing the princi pies of the foregoing cu sr~s to the
facts in the instant matter, it se.:ms elear that there \\-as~
as a matter of lav{, no caneollation of the insurance poliey~ Particularl~y is this true in the light of the rule of
lav{ that the provisions of an in~urance policy, in the rase
of any doubtt \vill be resolved in favor of the assured or
the beneficiary thereof. See R i.e lJ o-r ds v. .6'(l a..-n d a1~r1 A ccirlf·ut J.Jv~,ura.-uf~e (~o., 58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 1017; Gib.-~ou v.
Equitable Lif(~ Assura ~H'f /::oc·t'rty of the flnifrd States,
84 1J tah .::1-~;~~ 36 P ~ 2d 10~1. 1'he fact that this '\\.Tas a group
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policy does not change the ru] e since this Court has hera-.tofore held that a group policy will be construed most
strictly against the insurer~ Seo Bueke-r v. Equitable l.Jife
Assurance Society of the United States, 91 Utah 179, 63
P. 2d 604.

(b) IN ANY ~JVENT WHETHER OR XOT
THERE IIAD BEE~ A CANCELLATION
WAS AN ISSUE TO BE SUBIVfiTTED TO

THE JURY.
.A.t the time of pre-trial no claim '\\ras made hy De-

fendants that as a matter of law they were ontitled to
judgment. The Court framed an issue of fact over the
objection of Plaintiff who claimed that as a matter of law
she was entitled to judgment. The issue of fact for trial
was as to the effect of the inquiry made by decedent in
the follo\v-up slip4 (Exhibit D-7) This exhibit eontains
the only statement made by the decedent to either of the

Defendants concerning cancellation of insurance, as follows:" I ·it~sh to drop the 'life insurance' part of my policy if possible.,, (Emphasis added)

This language in the document caused Judge Ellett
to dismiss the

Plaint~ff's

Complaint. The 'vord ,; 'wish'"

as shown hereon must be construed in the context of the
remaining portion of the writing and can be construed as
being precatory, that is something that he desires, not as
a mandatory statement of something that must at all

events be done. The usual meaning of the word is that it
is precatory, something desired. (Sec H1 ords and Phrases;~
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VoL 45, pp. 359-360. See also 1959 Annual Accumulative
Pocket Part, p. 113.)

Like,vise, the \VOrds ''if possible'' rJave been construed by the c.ourt and particularly in the rn~e of Br(n.V11v. B-ishop, 105 fi.'f e. 272, 74 Atl. 724, 729 as follo\VS:
''The lexical meaning of the ~"'ord 'possible'
is 'capable of heing done; not contrary to the nature of things.~ .rrhe condition of th i o contract, as
expres~erl in tl1e ¥t,.ords 'if possible,' is to be interpreted \\··j1.h reference to the thing to he done, the
cutting and removing of the trees a~ timber. n

Courts 8hould only grant Summary Judgment where
the facts are clear and unequivocal. ll. R. C. P. 56 (e) provides in part as follo"\vs :
~'..

. . The judgment sought sl1a11 he rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositioTls, and admis~dons on IDe~ together with the affidavits:r if any,
sho\v that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party ig entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.... "

P rofcssor rd oore in l1 1s trea ti.se on tlH.~ li"lcd r~r.al R.ules
of Civil Procedure has this comment on this particular
rule:
"The function of the summaty judgment is to
avoid a useless trial j and a. trial is not only not
u.~eless {sic) but absolutely nr:cessary "~here there
is a genuine issue as to any material faf·t. ln. ruli·n..lf nn- a Jnotio-u for ,.;;;JunnnlrlJ }udgn1e·nt the court's
{tnu·tio-n ·is to det('r}n int~ u·1Jethe r such a ,acnn·i·ne
is.~ue c:ri . .·J S 7 not to rrsoll'r. any factual -isf:!.ues. '~
( )l on re 's F•ederal Practice, Vol. 6, p. ~101) (Emphasis added)
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'nrhe courts are in entire agreement that the
moving party for smnmary judgment has the burden of sho\ving the absence of any genuine issue as
to all the material facts, which, under applicable
princi pies of substantive la '"'T' entitle him to j udgment as a matter of law. The courtS" hold the
mo-vant to a strict sta·n.dard . To ~'tatisfy h-is burden
the movant must make a showing tha-t is quite Glear
what lhe truth 'is, and that excludes any real doubt
a.s to the ex.isten ce of any genuine issu-e of material
fact. Since it. is not the function of the trial court
to adjudicate genuine factual issues at the hearing
on the motion for summary judgment, in ruling on
the motio11 aJl infrrence.s of fact from the proofs
proffe-red at the hea.r-ing mu~~t be be drawn against
the tnoveldtt and in fat)or of the party opposing the
-;no f iou. And the pa pcrs supporting movant ~s position are closely scrutinized~ while the opposing
papers are indulgently treated, in determining
whether the movant has satisfied his burden.

''To satisfy the moving party's burden the evidentiary material before the court, jf taken as true,
must cstab1ish the absenee of any genuine issue
of material fact, and it must appear that there is
no real question as to the credibility of the evidentiary material, so that it is to he taken as true.
If the nonexit-Jt.e-rlee of any genuine issue of material fact is established by such credible evidence
that on the facts and the la\v the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, the motion should
he granted, uules8 the opposing party sl1ow~ good
reason "'·hy he is at the time of the hearing unable
to present facts in opposition to the mot.ion. If,
hov~rever, the papers before the coutt disclose a
real i~sue of credibility or, apart from credibility,
fail to establish clearly that there i ~ no genuine
issue as to anv material fact, the motion must be
denied . '' C~.f~ore 's Federal Practice~ VoL 6~ pp.
2133-2126) (Emphasis added)
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The evidence must be clear and uncquivoeal in order
to support a Summary Judgment, see l~ ou..ng v. Felornia
( 1952) 121 r; tab 646, 244 P. 2d 862 ( Cert. denied 344 U. S .
885); Ulibarri v. Ghriste1tson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P . 2d
170 ; Fountain v. Filson ( 1949) 336 U. S. 681, 61 S. Ct. 754,
'93 IJ. Ed . 971; II olbrook et ux v" Webster's Inc. et al,
(1958) ·7 Utah 2d 148, 320, P~ 2d 661.

Tho rule of law as to reviev{ of a summary judgment
is clearly stated in Federal Practice and Procedure, by
Barren and IIoltzoff, VoL 3~ p. 120, as follows:
''On appeal from a summary judgment, the
Court appeals should view the facts from a standpoint most favorable to the appellant and accept
his allegations of fact as true, and assume a state
of facts most favorable to him~ On appeal from a
summary judgment, the only question is \\~het-her
the allegations of the party against 'vhom it 'vas
rendered were sufficient to raise a material or
genuine issue of fact."
In this case the only e~idence then, upon which the
Court relied ir1 makir1g its determination is }3xhihit D-7
and in particular the part that states 0 I wish to drop the
~life insurance' part of my policy if possible~ Thank you .
/s/ Arthur 1\f. ~fanning.'' (Emphasis added)

The trial court then refused to permit any other eYidence to be entered to sl10\v \Yhat the intent of the decedent may have been, tou(']nding thnt thi5i Exhibit D-7 ·was
an unequivocal can{~r.llnt ion of the insurance policy R--75.
In so deciding the Court staterl:
":&.fay be if I am in error the Supreme Court at
your instance and request - T am sure you will
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take this matter there ~ will tell me that this is
a jury question and the jury must determine that,
but I think that is an unequivocal document, that
it cancelled his insurance, and when they ceased to
deduct the thirteen fifty from him, he knew, had
notice that they had accepted that, and therefore
there would be no jury questiont The complaint of
the pia intiff Vt~ill be dismissed. ' '
We respectfully submit that under the law as cited
the court should hold as a matter of law that the life insurance had not been cancelled since there must be a strict
compliance with the terms of the policy and Mr. Manning
never gave any cancellation of his deduction order. In
any event, the Exhibit D-7 is sufficiently ambiguous that
it is a jury question and the issue should have been submitted to the jury.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the insurance
policy has a strict provision by which the insurance could
be cancelled and terminated. That this provision was
not followed and all of the presumptions of law favor the
position that the p oliey sha11 be construed roost strictly
against the insurer and that the issue of whether or not
there was a cancellation must be one which is clear and
unequivocal in its nature and we respectfully submit t.hat
such is not the case here and thnt the matter should have
been submitted to the jury.

ARrrHUR H4 NIELSEN
DEAN E. CONDER
Attorneys for Appellant
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